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This study contributes to the pool of knowledge about the impact of monetary policy 
communication of central banks on financial instruments’ prices and assets’ value in 
emerging markets.  
 
Design/methodology/approach:  
Empirical analysis is executed using the National Bank of Poland (NBP) 
announcements about its monetary policy covering the data from the broad financial 
market in its 3 main segments: stock market, foreign exchange market and bonds 
market. The reactions are measured relative to the changes in the NBP 
announcements and also with respect to investors’ expectations. ARCH models with 
dummy variables are used as the main methodological tool. 
 
Findings:  
Bonds market and foreign exchange market are the most sensitive market segments, 
while interest rate and money supply are the most influential types of announcements. 
The changes of the revealed new macroeconomic figures had more impact on assets’ 
prices movements than the deviations from their expectations. Moreover, greater 
diversity of the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) members’ opinions on the voted 
motions, captured in the MPC voting reports, is associated with more cases of 
statistically significant NBP communication events. 
 
Practical implications: 
The findings have direct relevance for fund managers, portfolio analysts, investors and 
also for financial market regulators. 
 
Originality/value: 
The results provide novel evidence about how the emerging financial market responds 
to monetary policy announcements. They help understand the nature of the impact of 
public information on financial assets’ valuation and on movements of their prices, 




Keywords: Central bank; Macroeconomic announcements; Monetary policy; Emerging 
financial market reactions; Asset prices returns; National Bank of Poland (NBP); Stock market; 
Foreign exchange market; Bonds market. 
 
 









Central banks in emerging markets play an active role through their monetary 
policy actions and they may affect the valuation of assets by influencing the 
movements of financial market prices (see Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Wongswan 
(2009) and Cieślak, Morse and Vissing-Jorgensen (2019), Tiberto, de Moraes and 
Corrêa (2020), Rai, Rojer and Edirel (2021), among others).  
The impact of central banks on financial market is materialized as a result of 
their decisions to move interest rates or to change the value of other important 
macroeconomic variables, such as money supply etc. (see Hanousek, Kočenda and 
Kutan (2009), Hayo and Neuenkirch (2012), Sun (2020), Brubakk, Ter Ellen and  Xu 
(2021), Breitenlechner, Gründler and Scharler (2021)). The channels of transmission 
include covered or uncovered interest rates parity relationships in the foreign exchange 
market, discounting of future cash flows mechanism in the bonds market or the 
changing dynamics of capital flows in the stock market, which may be triggered by the 
central banks’ decisions (see Binder (2017), Weber (2019), Lamla and Vinogradov 
(2019), Hüning (2020), Bennani (2020), Beutel, Metiu and Stockerl (2021), among 
others). 
Recent research, relying on the learning-to-forecast (LTF) experimental 
framework, has shown that simpler, more accessible, communication of central banks 
tends to be more effective and that its effects work through the mechanisms that 
promote public understanding of the central bank’s goals and actions in the current 
economic context (Kryvtsov and Petersen (2021)). Also Bholat et al. (2019) argue, 
based on the results of a large-scale online experiment with a sample representative 
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of the UK population, that central banks’ communicative techniques, which use more 
simplified language and make monetary policy messages relatable to people's lives, 
increase public comprehension and trust in monetary and macroeconomic policy 
decisions.[1] 
In this study, we extensively investigate the impact of this type of central bank’s 
communication in form of monetary policy announcements of the National Bank of 
Poland (NBP) regarding the key macroeconomic data, which it releases on regular 
basis. Our evidence comprehensively covers 3 market segments (stock market, 
foreign exchange market and bonds market).  
Polish financial market is a particularly interesting case for analysing the central 
bank's communication and investors’ reactions as an important and unique emerging 
market, because in spite of the European Union (EU) membership it has its own central 
bank, which conducts independent monetary policy (i.e. independent even from the 
European Central Bank, which is responsible for monetary policy for most of the EU 
countries). In addition, Poland maintained its own national currency, the Polish zloty 
(PLN), instead of adopting the Euro, which is an important tool in planning and 
executing broader macroeconomic policy. This institutional environment was formed 
as a result of political changes and economic reforms, including central bank 
development, which were initiated in the early 1990s. Since the 2000s, the National 
Bank of Poland has been following the principle of conducting a regular and 
transparent communication policy with financial markets by publishing a range of 
macroeconomic data (most of which is announced on monthly basis) regarding its 
monetary policy variables.  
Regarding the size, Poland has also the biggest economy and the largest 
financial market in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region. Its foreign exchange 
market has been in the past two decades about twice as large as the next two markets 
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in the Czech Republic and in Hungary (see Triennial Central Bank Survey (2019) and 
the earlier BIS triennial surveys). The Polish stock market is also the biggest in the 
region. The Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) is the largest stock market in the CEE 
with a lot of initial public offerings (IPOs) activity.[2] Moreover, the bonds market in 
Poland is one of the largest in the CEE region. Already in 2012 it was the second 
biggest one in the broader central Europe region (after Vienna bond market in Austria) 
in terms of the number of the introduced bonds series.[3]  
Last but not least, Poland is often used as an example of successful economic 
transformation. Emerging markets around the world differ substantially in terms of their 
institutional characteristics, including such issues as existence of institutional voids, 
the relative importance of informal versus formal institutions as well as the institutional 
changes and transitions (Rottig D. (2016)), but also regarding broader macroeconomic 
benefits of financial development, the role of institutional quality and, in particular, such 
key feature as central bank’s independence (see e.g. Agoba et al. (2019) or (2021). 
However, it is argued that Poland’s experience in building successful institutions (which 
includes an independent central bank: the National Bank of Poland), as well as 
mitigating major institutional voids, can serve as a positive lesson for other countries 
and it can be instructive for other emerging markets, which are on a similar road to 
restructuring their economic systems (see e.g. Puffer, McCarthy and Jaeger (2016)). 
Overall, our evidence from Poland may, therefore, provide important lessons for 
other emerging markets that went through (or are currently going through) fundamental 
economic reforms and which switched to a market economy.[4] 
We deal with the investigation of the reaction of assets’ returns in the 3 most 
important market segments and we measure the effects of the NBP communication on 
the key instruments from the foreign exchange market, bonds market and stock 
market. Our research contributes to understanding how monetary transmission 
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channels operate in emerging markets economies, which implemented major 
institutional reforms. Furthermore, our results may also lead to better understanding of 
the monetary policy decisions of central banks, which should be helpful in construction 
of new theoretical models in finance.  
We show that the bonds and foreign exchange markets are more sensitive to 
central bank communication than the stock market, and that interest rate and money 
supply data are the most influential announcements, which has also direct implications 
for investment strategies. These findings are, therefore, relevant for the financial 
industry, because they may aid decision-making processes of fund managers, portfolio 
analysts and investors. 
Moreover, we also investigated the Monetary Policy Council voting patterns 
related to different MPCs terms in office and we show that they matter from the point 
of view of the intensity of markets reactions. The varying degree of diversity of the MPC 
members’ opinions, captured by the views dispersion measure, allowed us further to 
assess the change in the effectiveness of the Polish central bank’s communication. 
Overall, our study contributes to the empirical academic literature on the 
mechanisms of transmission of monetary policy to asset prices and on the role of 
central bank’s communication in 3 different asset markets. 
The uniqueness of the contribution of our results relies also on a combination of 
a very broad range of data from 3 market segments, the intra-daily data frequency and 
the results which link the findings about the markets reactions with the Monetary Policy 
Councils terms in office. All three aspects are very rarely analysed in the literature and, 
in particular, the use of very high frequency data (we exploit in this study the data at  
1-minute frequency of observations) is unique in emerging markets research (notable 
exceptions include earlier paper by Hanousek, Kočenda and Kutan (2009)). 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a 
literature review about the impact of public announcements on financial markets with 
a focus on the emerging markets. Section 3 describes the data, section 4 discusses 
methodology and section 5 reports estimation results from models from all 3 market 
segments and investigates the relevance of the Monetary Policy Council terms in office 
with a focus on the MPC members’ voting patterns. In section 6 we present a simulation 
of a trading strategy in the out–of–sample period relying on the in–sample estimates. 
Section 7 provides a discussion, while the last section 8 offers conclusions and points 
towards possible policy implications of the main findings from this study for other 
emerging markets. 
 
2. Literature Review 
  
 Central banks’ communication, and its impact on financial market, has been 
analysed for developed countries in numerous papers using typically the data from the 
US and the European Union relying mainly on the Federal Reserve Board (FED) and 
the European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy decisions (see the evidence 
published in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Wongswan (2009), Hausman and 
Wongswan (2011), Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013), Lucca and Moench (2015) 
and more recently in Cieślak, Morse and Vissing-Jorgensen (2019), among many 
others).[5] 
 However, the available studies on the role of central banks’ public 
announcements, and their influence on asset returns in emerging markets countries, 
are still scarce.[6] Majority of them focus on stock markets (see Ganapolsky and 
Schmuckler (2001), Robitaille and Roush (2006), Hanousek, Kočenda and Kutan 
(2009) or Anwer, Azmi and Ramadili (2019), among others), while substantially fewer 
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extant papers concern the investigations of other market segments (such as Serwa 
(2006), Büttner and Hayo (2012), Su, Ahmad and Wood (2020) and Sun (2020), who 
analysed interest rates and money market instruments, Andritzky, Bannister and 
Tamirisa (2007), who examined bonds market, or Frömmel, Han and Gysegem (2015) 
and Brzeszczyński and Kutan (2015), who investigated foreign exchange market). 
Empirical evidence from those studies points towards the existence of statistically 
significant reactions to the central banks’ communication, although the reported effects 
vary across markets segments and instruments.[7] 
 Regarding the research in this field specifically for Poland using the data about 
macroeconomic announcements, previous publications include Ziarko–Siwek (2004), 
Janecki (2012), Gurgul et al. (2012), Kubacki (2014), Kapuściński et al. (2014), 
Będowska–Sójka (2016) and Baranowski and Gajewski (2016), among others.  
 In the earlier study related directly to this paper, Brzeszczyński, Gajdka and 
Kutan (2017) analysed the reaction of the Polish market to the NBP central bank’s 
announcements, however the focus and scope of that research, the numbers of the 
NBP announcements and the instruments covered, sample periods (differing by nearly 
one decade) as well as the applied methods (we provide a very broad extension of the 
in-sample models estimations), in comparison to our current work are very different. 
However, our paper is much different and provides a substantial extension of this 
previous research. The study by Brzeszczyński, Gajdka and Kutan (2017) modelled 
only 2 instruments: one instrument from stock market (WIG index) and one instrument 
from the foreign exchange market (USD/PLN currency exchange rate), while we 
comprehensively investigate 12 instruments from 3 market segments (including bonds 
market, which was not considered at all in the Brzeszczyński, Gajdka and Kutan (2017) 
paper). Moreover, the range of the analysed announcements is different and so is also 
the overall focus of the conducted research, because Brzeszczyński, Gajdka and 
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Kutan (2017) concentrated on the analysis of changes in the trading activity (volume 
of trade and bid-ask spread variables) and on returns, while we focus on returns and, 
more importantly, on the types of changes of the central bank’s announcements (i.e. 
direction of change of the announced new figures, changes with respect to market 
expectations etc.) rather than on just simple dates of these events. Brzeszczyński, 
Gajdka and Kutan (2017) did not consider either any out-of-sample analysis, while we 
in this paper simulate an entire trading strategy in the out-of-sample period based on 
the in-sample estimates from the ARCH models. Last but not least, we also investigate 
in this current paper the relevance of the Monetary Policy Council terms in office, along 
with the voting patterns among its members, which is another contribution and 
important difference in comparison with the earlier study by Brzeszczyński, Gajdka and 
Kutan (2017). 
 Our paper provides, therefore, a substantial extension of the work presented in 
the paper by Brzeszczyński, Gajdka and Kutan (2017), which extensively 
demonstrates the economic significance of the estimation results from respective 
models by relying on the construction and simulation of an investment strategy using 
intra-daily data in the out-of-sample period until the year 2020.  
 There also exist very few, yet particularly interesting, studies, which investigate 
the impact of the verbal communication of the prominent policymakers on financial 
markets. For example, Gertler and Horvath (2018) analysed the European Central 
Bank’s Governing Council (GC) members’ public statements (speeches, conference 
discussions and media interviews) between GC meetings and examined a pattern of 
market responses to such ad hoc communication of those key ECB policy makers. 
Schmeling and Wagner (2019) further examined the tone of the ECB communication 
based on the transcripts of the ECB press conferences. A notable example in this 
stream of literature dealing with emerging markets is the earlier paper by Rozkrut et al. 
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(2007), which presents the analysis of the statements related to future monetary policy 
decisions (verbal statements reported by major news agencies and official 
communiqués of the central banks) and their link with the movements of the foreign 
exchange rates in the 3 largest CEE countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland.[8]  
In summary, the available research on emerging markets, especially those from 
the EU countries, is still limited and the existing literature reports predominantly the 
results using the data from stock markets.[9]  Our study extends, therefore, the current 
literature by providing new empirical evidence from Poland and using in one compact 
study a comprehensive dataset from 3 market segments: stock market, foreign 






The data sample used in our study covers over 10 years from 6th November 
2009 to 15th February 2020. The starting point in this period is the earliest time for 
which all the NBP announcements, as well as most of their respective expectations 
data, were available, so this is the longest data sample possible to investigate in this 
case. The frequency of data in our database is daily. The in–sample estimation period 
ends on 24th May 2019 and it includes a total of 2491 observations. The out–of–sample 
analysis further covers the period from 25th May 2019 to 15th February 2020. 
We constructed models for 12 financial instruments from 3 most important 
market segments on the broader financial market in Poland: stock market (stock 
indices: WIG, WIG20 and sWIG80)[10], foreign exchange market (currency exchange 
rates: USD/PLN, EUR/PLN, GBP/PLN, CHF/PLN and JPY/PLN)[11] and bonds market 
(1 year bonds, 2 years bonds, 5 years bonds and 10 years bonds). 
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In this study, we used the following announcements made on the regular basis 
by the National Bank of Poland informing about the release of its new monetary policy 
data: (1) interest rate, (2) money supply M3, (3) current account data and (4) official 
reserves.  
We captured the NBP announcements by constructing relevant dummy 
variables for the days when the particular news release events occurred. 
The interest rates dummy variables are coded for the four following situations: 
when there was an increase or decrease of the interest rate and when the announced 
new interest rate was above or below the market expectations. The market 
expectations were measured using the data reported by Bloomberg. 
Similarly, we define corresponding variables for the M3 money supply for the 
cases when the new M3 value increased or decreased and when its new value was 
above or below the market expectations and we use exactly the same definitions for 
the current account data in all four instances. 
In case of the official reserves, we could define only two dummy variables, i.e. 
when the value of the new official reserves data increased or decreased, because there 
were no market expectations available for this macroeconomic category, so we could 
not code the dummy variables for the deviations from the levels anticipated by the 
market. 
As mentioned earlier, across all the NBP announcements described above, 
during the entire period of our analysis there were 450 events, which are composed of 
the following numbers of news released for the individual dummy variables: 105 for 
interest rates, 115 for money supply, 115 for current account and also 115 for official 
reserves.  
A detailed summary of the variables, which we used in our models, is presented 




Table 1. Summary of dependent variables, control variables  
and independent variables used in all models 
 
Dependent variable Description Control variable Description 
Bonds Market Models: 
10 years bond yield 
Rate of return of Polish government 
10 years bonds 
Global bonds return 
Barclays Global Aggregate 
Total Return Index (in USD) 
1 year bond yield 
Rate of return of Polish government 
1 year bonds 
2 years bond yield 
Rate of return of Polish government 
2 years bonds 
5 years bond yield 
Rate of return of Polish government 
5 years bonds 
Foreign Exchange Market Models: 
Dependent variable Description Control variable Description 
CHF/PLN  
exchange rate  
return 
Rate of return of CHF/PLN 
exchange rate 
CHF basket 
Rate of return of basket of 
global currencies measured 
against CHF 
EUR/PLN  
exchange rate  
return 
Rate of return of EUR/PLN 
exchange rate 
EUR basket 
Rate of return of basket of 
global currencies measured 
against EUR 
GBP/PLN  
exchange rate  
return 
Rate of return of GBP/PLN 
exchange rate 
GBP basket 
Rate of return of basket of 
global currencies measured 
against GBP 
JPY/PLN  
exchange rate  
return 
Rate of return of JPY/PLN 
exchange rate 
JPY basket 
Rate of return of basket of 
global currencies measured 
against JPY 
USDPLN  
exchange rate  
return 
Rate of return of USD/PLN 
exchange rate 
USD basket 
Rate of return of basket of 
global currencies measured 
against USD 
Stock Market Models: 
Dependent variable Description Control variable Description 
sWIG80 index  
return 
Rate of return of  
sWIG80 stock index from WSE 
MSCI World Index 
return 
Rate of return of MSCI World 
Index 
WIG index  
return 
Rate of return of  
WIG stock index from WSE 
WIG20 index 
 return 
Rate of return of   
WIG20 stock index from WSE 
Independent variables Description 
Interest rate above expectations NBP's interest rate above market expectation 
Interest rate below expectations NBP’s interest rate below market expectation 
Increase of interest rate Increase of NBP's interest rate 
Decrease of interest rate Decrease of NBP's interest rate 
Money supply (M3) above expectations M3 money supply above market expectations 
Money supply (M3) below expectations M3 money supply below market expectations 
Increase of money supply (M3) Increase of M3 money supply 
Decrease of money supply (M3) Decrease of M3 money supply 
Current account above expectations Current account value above market expectations 
Current account below expectations  Current account value below market expectations 
Increase of current account Increase of current account value 
Decrease of current account Decrease of current account value 
Increase of official reserves Increase of international reserves 







The frequency of the NBP announcements is monthly and their more specific 
timings are as follows: money supply (M3) is released usually between 12th and 14th 
calendar day of every month, official reserves are published typically between 5th and 7th 
calendar day of every month, while current account data is revealed in the middle of every 
month. Interest rate announcements are made following the decisions of the Monetary 
Policy Council after its meetings (which are held on different days of the respective months). 
 
 
Table 2. NBP interest rate and other macroeconomic data announcements  












  Number of announcements: 
Total number of changes 
       
15 112 113 115 
       
          
Change upwards 5 63 62 63 
          
          
Change downwards 10 49 51 52 
          
Change the same as expected by the 
market 
        
7 7 28 – 
        
 
Change higher than expected  
by the market  
(‘positive surprise’) 
 
        
 
4 52 43 
– 
  
    
  
Change lower than expected  
by the market  
(‘negative surprise’) 
 
       
4 53 43 – 
  





Table 2 reports further the NBP data (interest rate and other macroeconomic 
data announcements) presented relative to market expectations, while Figure 1 depicts 
a sample of all four NBP announcements. It illustrates their frequency and shows their 
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regular distribution across time for two selected quarters of the year (i.e. Q3 and Q4 
2012 chosen as an example). 
 
Two main sources of data, which we exploited for the construction of our 
database, are as follows: (1) National Bank of Poland (data about the NBP 
announcements dates and the values of the newly revealed interest rates and other 
relevant macroeconomic figures) and (2) Bloomberg (data about prices from the 
foreign exchange market, stock market and bonds market segments).  
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of the NBP announcements  
in the example period of two quarters (Q3 and Q4 in the year 2012) 
 
 
Note: Figure 1 illustrates the regularity in the pattern of all four NBP announcements 
used in this study. The interest rate, money supply M3, current account data and 
official reserves are published at monthly frequency, so there are 12 releases every 
year for all of them except only for the interest rate, for which there are 11 
announcements made annually, because one meeting of the NBP monetary policy 
council in summer is skipped (typically in August due to summer holidays period). 
Therefore, Figure 1 which covers as an example two quarters of the year (i.e. Q3 
and Q4 in the year 2012) shows 6 announcements for the money supply M3, current 
account data and official reserves and only 5 announcements for the interest rate. 
 
 
We used in our models the foreign exchange rates quoted on the international 
interbank currency market, which are reported in the Bloomberg database. The data 
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for the stock market indices and bonds prices available in Bloomberg are originally 
sourced from the Warsaw Stock Exchange, where these instruments are traded.  




We focus comprehensively on the analysis of 3 market segments and we 
investigate their reactions to the release of key announcements of the National Bank 
of Poland. Because strong ARCH effects were detected, we exploited GARCH 
methodology (Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986)) as our modeling tool.  
We estimated the following GARCH(S,Q) models to capture the effects of the 
NBP communication in the returns of all 12 instruments from all 3 market segments: 
 
   
𝑟𝑡


























0   (2) 
  
where 0S , 0Q , 00  , 0s  and 0q  and: 
𝑟𝑡
𝑖
 – is daily rate of return from i–th financial instrument, 
𝐷𝑡−𝑘
𝑗
 – is the dummy variable taking on the value of 1 when the given j–th 
macroeconomic announcement was made and 0 otherwise. 
The number of types of macroeconomic announcements is denoted by J. The 
types of these new announcements are: interest rate, money supply, current account 
and official reserves.  
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As discussed in the previous section, which described the data, for the first three 
types we distinguish four sub–types: above, below, up and down. In case of official 
reserves only the data regarding increase/decrease was available. Therefore, J is 
different for some variables, i.e. for the interest rate, M3 money supply and current 
account J = 4 and for official reserves J = 2.  
The lag or the lead of each j–th macroeconomic news announcement is denoted 
by K. As we are focused on the analysis of the short–term reactions, in the estimations 
of our models the maximum lag is equal to -3 and maximum lead equal to +3 days. 
Every i–th equation includes also the control variables 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟. In case of the 
models for the bonds, the control variable is the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate 
Total Return Index as the global bond market indicator. For the stock market models, 
we adopted MSCI World Index as the commonly used measure of the global stock 
market movements. In the foreign exchange market models, we used the Bloomberg’s 
baskets of global currencies measured against respective currency (EUR, USD, CHF, 
GBP or JPY). The control variables for all models are summarized in Table 1. [12] 
We estimated the coefficients 𝛽0, 𝛽𝑗,𝑘 and 𝛾𝑗,𝑘 from equation (1) for every i–th 
financial instrument in our data sample. The focus of our investigation and further 
discussions in this study are the dummy variables parameters’ estimates: 𝛽𝑗,𝑘. 
In cases when there was persistent heteroscedasticity, we applied higher orders 
of GARCH specification than GARCH(1,1), such as GARCH(2,1), GARCH(1,2), 
GARCH(2,2) etc. We also investigated the existence of the asymmetric effects by 
testing different alternative specifications (including EGARCH, GJR-GARCH etc.). If in 
any of the models there was autocorrelation detected, we eliminated it by adding the 
AR and/or MA terms. 





Table 3. ARCH and autocorrelation statistics 
 
 Q10 Obs * R–squared 
Prob.  
Chi–Square(10) 
1 year bond yield 0.21 4.44 0.93 
2 years bond yield 0.19 6.61 0.76 
5 years bond yield 0.68 10.23 0.42 
10 years bond yield 0.86 12.58 0.25 
CHF/PLN exchange rate return 0.60 14.06 0.17 
EUR/PLN exchange rate return 0.39 15.63 0.11 
GBP/PLN exchange rate return 0.49 9.96 0.44 
JPY/PLN exchange rate return 0.36 9.15 0.52 
USDPLN exchange rate return 0.23 7.56 0.67 
WIG index return 0.90 15.52 0.11 
WIG20 index return 0.31 14.21 0.16 
sWIG80 index return 0.38 11.84 0.30 
 
Note: Each row represents error term statistics for each of the 12 models defined by equation (1). 
 
Next section presents the estimation results from models (1) – (2) for all 12 
instruments. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1. Markets Reactions to the NBP Announcements  
 
Tables 4 – 8 report comprehensively the estimation results for all 3 market 
segments covering all 12 instruments for k = 0 (i.e. no lead and no lag of the dummy 
variables) and also for k = -2, -1, +1, +2 (representing the respective lags and leads of 
+/- 1 day and +/- 2 days). Overall, there are 65 cases of statistically significant dummy 
variables estimates detected across all Tables 4 – 8. 
The most responsive instruments were bonds (33 cases of statistically 
significant dummies) followed closely by foreign exchange rates (28 cases of 
statistically significant dummies) and then stock indices (only 4 cases of statistically 
significant dummies).  
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In terms of timing, there appear to be far more instances of statistically 
significant reactions before the announcement day (a total of 36 cases for both k = -2 
and k = -1) than after the announcement day (a total of only 15 cases for both k = +1 
and k= +2). On the announcement day, i.e. for k = 0, there were 14 cases of statistically 
significant estimates of dummy variables.  
More specifically, Table 4 shows that for simultaneous relationship for k = 0, the 
most responsive market segment by far was the bonds market (11 cases out of 14 
cases of statistically significant estimates in the entire Table 4), followed by the foreign 
exchange market and the stock market (only 2 and 1 cases, respectively). Estimates 
in the bonds models are also the strongest in terms of the level of statistical significance 
(i.e. in all instances at 1% and 5% level contrary to the models of stock indices and 
currency exchange rates where significance was found mainly at the weaker 10% 
level). Regarding the type of news, there is a dominance of interest rates’ 
announcements evident in Table 4 (with 9 cases of statistically significant estimates). 
The next two most important announcements were official reserves data and M3 
money supply (albeit with just 3 and 2 cases, respectively). 
Table 5 presents the corresponding estimates for dummy variables from the 
models with the lag k = -1. Out of 23 statistically significant results, there are 11 and 
10 cases in bonds market and foreign exchange market segments, respectively, and 
only 2 cases in the stock market segment. The most important type of announcement 
appears to be interest rate (with 11 statistically significant cases) followed by M3 







Table 4. Values of coefficients 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=0 from equation (1), for k = 0 (i.e. no lead and no lag) 
 
k = 0  










































Interest rate above expectations 0.0058 0.0153 0.0223*** 0.0054 0.0008 -0.0007 0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0025 -0.0042 -0.0058 
Interest rate below expectations -0.0157** -0.0514*** -0.032*** -0.0187** -0.0019 0.0009 -0.0010 0.0015 -0.0003 0.0039 -0.0000 0.0002 
Increase of interest rate -0.0092** -0.0050 -0.0107 -0.0076*** 0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0020 0.0014 -0.0026 0.0019 0.0002 -0.0002 
Decrease of interest rate -0.0004 0.0109** 0.0112*** -0.0017 0.0023 0.0004 0.0013 0.0004 0.0016 -0.0015 0.0001 -0.0002 
Money supply (M3) above expectations -0.0001 -0.0074 -0.0048 -0.0004 0.0031 0.0005 0.0039** 0.0019 0.0027 -0.0015 0.0019 0.0016 
Money supply (M3) below expectations 0.0012 0.0068 -0.0020 0.0010 0.0035* 0.0012 0.0020 0.0016 0.0021 -0.0018 0.0011 0.0009 
Increase of money supply (M3) 0.0004 0.0042 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0028 -0.0006 -0.0022 -0.0020 -0.0021 0.0018 -0.0010 -0.0000 
Decrease of money supply (M3) -0.0005 -0.0023 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0021 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0013 0.0015 -0.0002 -0.0001 
Current account above expectations 0.0016 -0.0024 0.0019 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0017 0.0034 0.0047 
Current account below expectations  0.0006 -0.0009 0.0012 0.0031 0.0003 0.0007 0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0015 0.0035 0.0033 
Increase of current account -0.0010 0.0049 -0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0000 0.0010 -0.0034 -0.0038 
Decrease of current account -0.0015 0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0037 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0024 
Increase of official reserves -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0000 
Decrease of official reserves -0.0028** -0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0032** 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0016* -0.0012 -0.0012 
 











Table 5. Values of coefficients 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=−1 from equation (1), for k = -1 (representing 1 day lag) 
 
k = -1  










































Interest rate above expectations 0.0032 0.0206*** 0.0025 0.0086 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0005 0.0031 -0.0009 -0.0043 -0.0050 -0.0065 
Interest rate below expectations -0.0048 -0.0199* -0.0477*** -0.0267** -0.0047 -0.0030 -0.0047 -0.0074** -0.0061 0.0012 0.0008 0.0003 
Increase of interest rate -0.0038 -0.0093 0.0011 -0.0019 -0.0033 -0.0012 -0.0045** -0.0022 -0.0030 0.0012 0.0011 0.0008 
Decrease of interest rate 0.0010 0.0090 0.0159*** 0.0127*** 0.0029* 0.0014 0.0032** 0.0047* 0.0022 0.0020 0.0040 0.0039 
Money supply (M3) above expectations 0.0011 -0.0081 0.0018 -0.0020 0.0022* 0.0003 0.0029* 0.0036** 0.0036* -0.0006 -0.0026 -0.0044* 
Money supply (M3) below expectations 0.0047* -0.0042 0.0073* 0.0024 0.0020 0.0010 0.0028 0.0022 0.0030 -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0040 
Increase of money supply (M3) -0.0030 0.0049 -0.0057 -0.0024 -0.0008 0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0013 0.0005 0.0022 0.0032 
Decrease of money supply (M3) -0.0031 0.0026 -0.0036 -0.0008 -0.0010 0.0002 -0.0021 -0.0018 -0.0015 0.0004 0.0030 0.0050* 
Current account above expectations 0.0036 0.0029 0.0004 0.0076** -0.0010 0.0005 0.0018* -0.0014 0.0013 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0005 
Current account below expectations  0.0002 0.0047 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0007 
Increase of current account -0.0041* 0.0018 0.0025 -0.0017 0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0005 0.0009 0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0004 
Decrease of current account -0.0014 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0019 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 
Increase of official reserves -0.0015 0.0008 0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0014 -0.0016 
Decrease of official reserves 0.0000 0.0011 -0.0022 -0.0028* 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0000 0.0002 
 














Table 6. Values of coefficients 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=1 from equation (1), for k = +1 (representing 1 day lead) 
 
 k = +1  










































Interest rate above expectations 0.0020 -0.0071 0.0114** 0.0048 -0.0013 0.0004 -0.0012 0.0025 -0.0018 0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0036 
Interest rate below expectations 0.0177 0.0097 0.0089 0.0195 0.0011 0.0007 0.0023 -0.0017 0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0032 -0.0036 
Increase of interest rate 0.0010 0.0092 0.0070 0.0041 0.0005 -0.0008 0.0001 -0.0015 0.0001 0.0004 0.0048 0.0072 
Decrease of interest rate -0.0038 -0.0106* -0.0074 -0.0067 -0.0022 -0.0007 -0.0026 -0.0015 -0.0018 -0.0005 0.0019 0.0023 
Money supply (M3) above expectations -0.0025 0.0016 -0.0008 -0.0039 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0023 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0012 0.0001 -0.0000 
Money supply (M3) below expectations -0.0010 0.0055 0.0030 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0010 0.0014 0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0019 
Increase of money supply (M3) 0.0047* -0.0009 0.0019 0.0065*** 0.0002 0.0006 0.0016 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0015 0.0010 0.0022 
Decrease of money supply (M3) 0.0018 -0.0040 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0015 -0.0012 0.0004 0.0011 0.0019 
Current account above expectations 0.0014 -0.0053 0.0025 -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0016** -0.0018 -0.0020 0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0028 
Current account below expectations  -0.0001 -0.0043 -0.0003 -0.0024 -0.002* -0.0006 -0.0022 -0.0015 -0.0018 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0005 
Increase of current account -0.0036 0.0029 -0.0015 -0.0006 0.0022** 0.0014** 0.0018 0.0021 0.0014 0.0003 0.0015 0.0017 
Decrease of current account -0.0022 0.0043 -0.0017 0.0003 0.0017 0.0008 0.0019 0.0022 0.0015 0.0016 -0.0008 -0.0018 
Increase of official reserves 0.0010 0.0023 0.0026 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0004 0.0009 0.0013 
Decrease of official reserves -0.0018 0.0010 -0.0020 -0.0016 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0014 
 












Table 7. Values of coefficients 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=−2 from equation (1), for k = -2 (representing 2 days lag) 
 
 k = -2  










































Interest rate above expectations 0.0000 0.0119 0.0032 -0.0015 0.0011 0.0025 0.0013 -0.0006 0.0029 0.0014 0.0026 0.0031 
Interest rate below expectations 0.0079 -0.0013 0.0007 0.0262*** 0.0041 0.0020 0.0055* 0.0109*** 0.0058 0.0014 0.0054 0.0054 
Increase of interest rate 0.0001 -0.0106 -0.0024 0.0042* 0.0020 0.0011 0.0028 -0.0004 0.0021 -0.0008 0.0003 0.0005 
Decrease of interest rate -0.0075* -0.0021 0.0010 -0.0075** -0.0038* -0.0024 -0.0051*** -0.0058*** -0.0060*** 0.0019 -0.0028 -0.0029 
Money supply (M3) above expectations 0.0023 0.0073 0.0029 0.0014 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0012 0.0001 -0.0019 -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0017 
Money supply (M3) below expectations 0.0044** 0.0024 0.0012 0.0015 -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0024** -0.0006 -0.0009 0.0011 0.0019 0.0022 
Increase of money supply (M3) -0.0014 -0.0067 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0010 0.0009 -0.0012 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0009 0.0013 
Decrease of money supply (M3) -0.0018 -0.0018 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0021 -0.0040 -0.0045 
Current account above expectations -0.0018 0.0017 -0.0016 0.0013 -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0008 -0.0006 0.0007 0.0005 0.0000 
Current account below expectations  0.0000 0.0019 0.0006 0.0035 0.0004 0.0009 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0016 -0.0025 
Increase of current account 0.0011 -0.0012 0.0045 -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0005 0.0004 
Decrease of current account -0.0008 -0.0013 0.0002 -0.0041 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0003 0.0005 0.0010 0.0003 0.0010 0.0018 
Increase of official reserves -0.0012 0.0013 0.0036 -0.0026 0.0008 0.0003 0.0002 0.0011 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0008 
Decrease of official reserves 0.0007 -0.0015 0.0023 -0.0002 0.0012 0.0009 0.0011 0.0019** 0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0021 -0.0012 
 













Table 8. Values of coefficients 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=2 from equation (1), for k = +2 (representing 2 days lead) 
 
k = +2  










































Interest rate above expectations 0.0013 -0.0012 0.0004 0.0007 -0.0017 -0.0032 -0.0021 -0.0015 -0.0034 -0.0004 0.0006 0.0012 
Interest rate below expectations 0.0002 0.0041 0.0105 0.0029 -0.0062 -0.0054** -0.0061 -0.0040 -0.0038 0.0055 0.0035 0.0025 
Increase of interest rate -0.0040 -0.0157** -0.0018 -0.0041 -0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0003 0.0027 0.0028 0.0010 0.0028 0.0044 
Decrease of interest rate -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0054 -0.0060 0.0046 0.0041* 0.0050 0.0033 0.0049 -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0021 
Money supply (M3) above expectations 0.0007 0.0081 0.0023 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0011 0.0004 -0.0007 0.0006 -0.0014 -0.0024 -0.0032 
Money supply (M3) below expectations -0.0015 0.0018 0.0001 -0.0029 0.0007 0.0003 0.0010 0.0018 0.0006 -0.0015 -0.0021 -0.0024 
Increase of money supply (M3) 0.0009 -0.0049 -0.0042 0.0024 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0010 -0.0007 0.0012 0.0031 0.0040 
Decrease of money supply (M3) 0.0040 0.0000 -0.0009 0.0022 0.0003 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0009 0.0006 0.0008 0.0046 0.0056 
Current account above expectations 0.0033 0.0045 0.0042 0.0033 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0006 0.0011 0.0005 0.0009 0.0009 0.0004 
Current account below expectations  0.0055 -0.0012 0.0018 0.0057 0.0017 0.0009 0.0014 0.0011 0.0019 0.0010 0.0000 -0.0006 
Increase of current account -0.0057 -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0062 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0010 0.0004 0.0005 
Decrease of current account -0.0055 -0.0011 -0.0039 -0.0062 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0003 0.0010 0.0014 
Increase of official reserves -0.0004 0.0035* 0.0018 0.0010 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0008 
Decrease of official reserves -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0004 -0.0020 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0018*** 0.0006 0.0016 
 
Note: *** – denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** – denotes statistical significance at 5% level and * – denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
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The results for k = +1 are illustrated in Table 6, which depicts much lower 
number of statistically significant cases (only 8 compared with 30 in previous Table 5 
with the variant for k = -1) and it evidences that the most responsive instruments were 
bonds and currencies (4 cases each out of the total of 8 cases in the entire Table 6 
with no significance at all in the stock market models), while the current account 
announcements were the most influential type of news followed by interest rate and 
M3 money supply (4, 2 and 2 cases, respectively). 
Table 7 presents the results for the variant of models with lag k = -2, where the 
foreign exchange market was the most responsive market segment (with 8 cases of 
statistically significant estimates out of 13 cases in the entire Table 7) followed by 
bonds market (5 cases statistically significant estimates). The most dominant type of 
news by far were interest rates. 
Finally, Table 8 with the results for k = +2 shows that, once again, there is a 
much lower number of instances of statistically significant estimates in the variants of 
models with leads than in the variants of models with the corresponding lags (only 7 
versus 13 cases for lead k = +2 and lag k = -2, respectively). The foreign exchange 
market was the most responsive market segment (4 cases of statistically significant 
estimates) followed by the bonds market and the stock market (with 2 and 1 cases, 
respectively), whereas the most important types of announcements were official 
reserves and interest rate.[13] 
 
5.2. Relevance of the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) Terms in Office 
 
 The sample period in our study spans across three terms in office of the three 
different Monetary Policy Councils (MPCs) of the National Bank of Poland, which over 
time included different members within those groups. The existing literature suggests 
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that the composition of the MPCs is important for the their decision-making processes 
and that it also matters for the perception of the MPC’s decisions by the market 
participants from at least two points of view: (1) Proportions of the MPC members 
regarded as 'hawks' or 'doves’ due to their approaches to monetary policy execution 
and (2) Voting consistency of the MPC members, which reflects the degree of the 
diversity or convergence of their views (see e.g. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) and 
Bank for International Settlements (2009)). 
In this section, we further explore this issue and we verify whether the financial 
market in Poland reacted similarly or differently depending on which MPC was in office 
and depending on the MPCs composition characteristics as well as the voting 
consistency of their members. 
In order to do it, we constructed the following models with dummy variables 
capturing the three periods of the MPC terms (MPC1, MPC2 and MPC3) and, 
additionally, we also control for the possible months of the year effects by adding the 
monthly dummies: 
   
𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝑥 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 · 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑛 +  𝛾 · 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=𝐽𝑎𝑛





𝑥 – number of statistically significant events every month in three variants for 
x, where x = 1 for the count of events captured only by coefficients 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=0 from equation 
(1) for k = 0  (i.e. statistically significant results only from Table 4), x = 2 for the count 
of events captured by coefficients 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=0, 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=−1 and 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=1 from equation (1) for k = 0, 
k = -1 and k = +1 (i.e. statistically significant results from Tables 4, 5 and 6) and x = 3 
for the count of events captured by coefficients 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=0, 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=−1, 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=1, 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=−2 and 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=2 
from equation (1) for k = 0, k = -1, k = +1, k = -2 and k = +2 (i.e. statistically significant 




𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑛  – dummy variables for three different terms of the three Monetary Policy 
Councils denoted as n = 1, 2 and 3, i.e. MPC1, MPC2 and MPC3, 
𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑚 – dummy variables for months of the year, where: m = Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr … M. 
 The terms of the Monetary Policy Councils over our whole sample period were 
as follows: MPC1 until December 2010, MPC2 from January 2011 until December 
2016 and MPC3 from January 2017 onwards. 
Estimation results of dummy variables parameters from model (3) are presented 
in Tables 9a, 9b and 9c.  
The estimates for MPC1 are not significant in any variant, while the estimates 




3 (as shown in Tables 9a, 9b and 9c). MPC3 is significant and 
negative in Tables 9b and 9c in models for 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑡
2 and 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑡
3. Therefore, these 
results clearly show the differences in the intensity of reactions to the NBP 
announcements depending on the period of the specific Monetary Policy Council term. 
In particular, the reactions of the financial market in Poland are more intensive during 
the second term of the Monetary Policy Council and they tend to be less intensive 
during its third term in office throughout our entire sample period. 
When the composition of the MPCs is inspected more closely, there are no clear 
differences evident between the sub-groups of the MPC members regarded as ‘hawks’ 
or ‘doves’. The reasons for it are as follows. Firstly, the classifications of some MPC 
members as 'hawks' or 'doves' were not always obvious and, secondly, due to this 
issue it can not be stated with sufficiently high degree of certainty that the MPCs were 
always clearly dominated by one of these two sub-groups. Thus, this factor cannot be 






Table 9a. Dummy variable estimates for the durations of the three Monetary Policy 
Councils terms in models of the count of the statistically significant announcements 
captured by coefficients 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=0 from equation (1) for k = 0 (and controlled for the month 










- - - - 
























































































Notes: (1) t-statistics in brackets. (2) *** – denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** – denotes statistical 













Table 9b. Dummy variable estimates for the durations of the three Monetary Policy 
Councils terms in models for the count of the statistically significant announcements 
captured by coefficients 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=0, 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=−1 and 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=1 from equation (1) for k = 0, k = -1 and 










- - - - 




























































- -1.565096 *** 
(-3.305559) 
- -1.181481 * 
(-1.788422) 
- -1.130866 ** 
(-1.976514) 
Sept 
- -0.915425 ** 
(-2.101621) 



















Notes: (1) t-statistics in brackets. (2) *** – denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** – denotes statistical 









Table 9c. Dummy variable estimates for the durations of the three Monetary Policy 
Councils terms in models for the count of the statistically significant announcements 
captured by coefficients 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=0, 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=−1, 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=1, 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=−2 and 𝛽𝑗,𝑘=2 from equation (1) for  
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- -1.277559 *** 
(-2.919765) 
- -1.298850 ** 
(-2.337110) 
- -1.237966 ** 
(-2.478820) 
Sept 
- -0.806814 ** 
(-2.090561) 
- -0.824564 ** 
(-2.024225) 

















Notes: (1) t-statistics in brackets. (2) *** – denotes statistical significance at 1% level, ** – denotes statistical 







Hence, we next turn our attention to the patterns of voting regarding the most 
important decisions about interest rates. This information is recorded in the voting 
reports with the summaries of the Monetary Policy Council members’ voting results 
and it is publicly available from the NBP.[14]  
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) argue, based on their analysis of data from the 
Federal Reserve in the USA, the Bank of England in the UK and the European Central 
Bank (ECB), that communicating the diversity of views among the MPC committee 
members about the monetary policy lowers the market’s ability to anticipate policy 
decisions as well as the future path of interest rates. The study by Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2005) concludes that it is the collegiality of views on the monetary policy 
that enhances the effectiveness of central bank communication. 
Our results, reported so far in Tables 4 – 8, are directly applicable in the 
investigation of this matter for the Polish central bank’s MPCs decisions and the related 
reactions of the financial market in Poland. We combine them below with a detailed 
analysis of the proportions of ‘for’ and ‘against’ votes regarding the interest rates 
decisions, which were subject to voting by all three MPC councils. This data, extracted 
directly from the MPCs voting reports, allowed us to construct a measure of dispersion 
of MPC members’ views. 






      (4) 
where: 
𝒩(𝑓𝑜𝑟)𝑑 – is the number of ‘for’ votes for the voted motion at the MPC meeting d, 




D – is the total number of voted motions at the MPC meetings during the entire MPC 
term.   
 The measure DISP directly captures the dispersion of votes of the MPC 
members. Higher values of DISP mean lower dispersion of views (or: stronger 
agreement) of the MPC members, while its lower values indicate higher degree of 
disagreement of views (with DISP = 0 meaning that the same numbers of MPC 
members voted ‘for’ and ‘against’ a particular motion). 
 In the investigated sample period in this paper, there was only one interest rate 
change during the first term of the MPC, but there was no reporting requirement at that 
time regarding the voting results and the voting report does not exist in this one 
particular instance, so the interest rate voting decisions were not possible to compare 
for the first MPC term (however the MPC1 dummies estimates were not significant in 
our models either). Hence, we could conduct a comparison only for the decisions in 
the next two MPC terms.  
The key result is that the value of DISP measure during the second term was 
4.64, while in the third term it was substantially higher and it reached the value of 6.31. 
Such difference implies that the MPC members during the second term in office voted 
with slimmer majority of votes, which represents a larger divergence of the MPC 
members’ opinions. In the third MPC term the voting pattern was more consistent 
indicating higher degree of agreement of the MPC members’ views.  
This finding means that greater diversity of the MPC members’ opinions is 
associated with more cases of statistically significant NBP communication events 
during the second term of the MPC, while higher degree of collegiality of their views 
occurring in the third term coincided with the lower number cases of statistically 
significant NBP communication events.  
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Therefore, following Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005), we can interpret this result 
that the effectiveness of the Polish central bank’s communication was enhanced in the 
most recent period during the third term of the Monetary Policy Council in office. 
 
6. Analysis in the Out–of–Sample Period 
 
Results reported so far focus predominantly on the statistical significance of the 
estimated parameters, which we detected in our models. In this section, we now 
attempt to answer the question about what is the economic significance of our findings 
by constructing a trading strategy in the out–of–sample period, which relies directly on 
the in–sample estimations, and by investigating its performance. 
The estimates presented in Tables 4 – 8, which capture the impact of the NBP 
communication on the movements of the assets’ prices, show evidence of appreciation 
and depreciation effects in response to the Polish central bank’s monetary policy 
decisions. Therefore, we now turn to investigating in more details whether events such 
as the release of new data by the NBP may create profit opportunities for the financial 
market investors. In order to do it, we constructed an investment strategy and analysed 
the possible profits and losses from trades based on the statistically significant 
estimates (at the level at least p < 0.10) of the dummy variables lagged by one day (i.e. 
for k = -1) from Table 5. 
 Due to the fact that the NBP announcements were always made in the afternoon 
at 2:00 p.m., for the out–of–sample analysis presented in this section we use the intra–
daily 1–minute frequency data to measure the profitability of trades based on the 
statistically significant dummies. Following Brzeszczyński and Kutan (2015), we argue 
that many traders are likely to transact within rather short time horizons in response to 
such news as public information contained in the central bank announcements. 
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Therefore, the reason why we use intra–daily frequency, and examine in such detail 
the changes in the assets’ prices over these very short periods of time, is that any such 
investigation should consider investment horizons finer than just 1 day intervals 
 Our trading rule is as follows. We assume that an investor opens a long position 
in the particular asset on the day when there is the NBP announcement, which was 
found in results in Table 5 to be statistically significant (at the level at least  p < 0.10) 
and had a positive sign, or an investor opens a short position when there is an 
announcement, which in Table 5 was found to be statistically significant (at the level at 
least p < 0.10) and had a negative sign. The only exception to this rule are bonds, 
because the bonds models in the in–sample period analysis are constructed using 
bonds yields as the dependent variable, while the trading strategy relies on buying or 
selling the particular assets using their prices, so the generated signals to trade must 
predict price changes. Hence, because of the inverse relation between bond’s price 
and its yield, the negative sign of the estimated coefficient implies the decrease of the 
bond’s yield, which means the increase of the bond’s price, so it ultimately indicates 
opening of a long position. Similarly, a positive sign of the estimate in the bond’s model 
predicts opening of a short position. 
The simulated positions are closed at the end of the investment horizon, i.e. at 
the end of day t+1. The reason why we use the estimates from Table 5 from the models 
with the lagged dummy variables by one day, rather than from Table 4 with the variants 
of models with dummy variables without lags (so in the out–of–sample period this is 
also, naturally, reflected in the one day shift between day t and day t+1), is that the 
NBP announcements were released always in the afternoon at 2:00 p.m., i.e. shortly 
before the markets become less active and close soon afterwards (the trading session 
at the Warsaw Stock Exchange ends at 5:00 p.m.), so the simulation of the transactions 
based on the estimates from models without lags would not make much sense 
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(because the daily returns cover the whole day period from 9:00 a.m., while such trades 
could only be executed for the small fraction of the day at its end, i.e. after 2:00 p.m.). 
Hence, in this section we focus mainly on the investigation of the results of the strategy 
during the next day t+1, although for the robustness analysis purposes we also 
checked its performance on day t from 2:00 p.m. until the end of the day at 5:00 p.m. 
We examined the performance of this trading strategy for days t and t+1, which 
is illustrated in Table 10 and, also, in more details further in Table 11, which allowed 
us to present differences between a broader spectrum of very detailed intra-daily 
results.  
The in–sample estimations cover the period until 24th June 2019, so the out–of–
sample analysis starts on 25th June 2019. The out–of–sample period includes over 7 
months and it ends on 15th February 2020. 
During the entire out–of–sample period there were no interest rate changes 
made by the NBP in Poland, so we could not use this particular type of the NBP 
announcement, however we could exploit the information about the publication of other 
monetary policy data. Ultimately, we have identified 11 announcements in the out–of–
sample period, which include: decrease of M3 money supply, increase of official 
reserves and increase of current account, i.e. there is a total of 11 events in the bonds 
market and in the stock market (while there were no cases of statistically significant 
estimates in Table 5 for these types of announcements in the foreign exchange market 
models). 
Table 10 presents returns from our investment strategy for trades that are 
executed based on the rules described above.  
The results in Table 10 demonstrate that such strategy would be profitable in 
most cases in the investment horizon defined as the end of day t+1, but its performance 
is much worse on day t. At the end of day 1, the individual trades for all 11 events are 
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profitable in only 5 out of 11 instances, while at the end of day t+1, the individual trades 
for those 11 events are profitable in as many as 8 out of 11 cases. 
Therefore, it is evident that the profits only materialize on day t+1 consistently 
with the statistically significant estimates reported in Table 5.  
The patterns of intra–daily performance of all 11 trades using 1–minute 
frequency data, as well as the overall pattern of their combined performance, is 
illustrated in graphs in Figure 2.  
In particular, the first graph for the combined strategy depicts that it would, in 
fact, deliver the loss on day t during the interval from 2:00 p.m. until the end of the day 
at 5:00 p.m. and it also shows the pattern of profitability during day t+1 from 9:00 a.m. 




Table 10. Investment strategy results in the out–of–sample period  
from 25th May 2019 to 15th February 2020 on days t and t+1 
 
Profit / loss for individual trades for all the events  
on day t 
Event: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
0.20% 0.04% -0.06% 0.01% -0.07% -0.44% -0.21% 0.13% -0.05% 0.03% -0.03% 
Profit / loss for individual trades for all the events  
on day t+1 
Event: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
0.63% 0.03% -0.10% 0.21% 0.05% 0.16% 0.10% 0.15% -0.08% 0.12% -0.32% 
 






Figure 2. Performance of trading strategies in the out–of–sample period  
from 25th May 2019 to 15th February 2020 for all individual 11 trades  
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We further verified whether the changes in the effects of the NBP monetary 
policy announcements between the trading strategies executed on day t and on day 
t+1 are statistically significant.  
For this purpose, we applied the t-test for equality of means for the returns from 
all the investigated investment horizons covering days t and t+1, which are divided by 
1-hour intervals from +1 hour through +3 hours (i.e. end of day t) until +27 hours (i.e. 
end of day t+1). The trading horizons are defined as the intervals of time between the 
NBP announcements (made always at 2:00 p.m.) and the following points of time 
denoted in Table 11 as: ‘+1 hour’, ‘+2 hours’, ‘+3 hours (i.e. end of day t)’ for day t and 
from  ‘+19 hours’  to ‘+27 hours (i.e. end of day t+1)’ for day t+1. 
Table 11 reports the t-test statistics with their respective significance levels for 
all combinations of trading horizons from +1 hour to +27 hours. They show that the 
highest returns have been achieved towards the end of day t+1 around 3:00 – 4:00 
p.m. in the afternoon (corresponding with the investment horizon of +25 and +26 hours 
since the NBP announcement at 2:00 p.m. on previous day t), but not at the very end 
of day t+1 at 5:00 p.m. The t-test statistic is significant for the differences in returns 
between the end of day t (i.e. +3 hours at 5:00 p.m.) and returns on day t+1 after +24 
hours (i.e. at 2:00 p.m.), after +25 hours (i.e. at 3:00 p.m.) and after +26 hours (i.e. at 
4:00 p.m.). 
These results clearly show that the changes in the effects of the NBP monetary 
policy announcements between the trading strategies on days t and t+1 are statistically 
significant indeed and they manifest themselves most strongly in case of differences 
between the returns at the end of day t and the returns achieved on day t+1 by around 





Table 11. Values of t-test for equality of means for the trading strategies’ returns among all investment horizons covering days t and t+1 
divided by 1-hour intervals from +1 hour through +3 hours (i.e. end of day t) until +27 hours (i.e. end of day t+1). 
 
Trading horizons                       
on days t and t+1                          
from NBP announcement        





























































































































+1 hour -0.288529 -0.96252 -0.641861 0.75125 0.878269 0.788813 0.977159 1.126609 1.579285 1.396253 0.829867 
+2 hours - -0.625639 -0.329977 0.886213 1.023471 0.93258 1.120157 1.263189 1.681781 1.514752 0.981907 
+3 hours (i.e. end of day t) - - 0.290953 1.278916 1.475903 1.362382 1.586912 1.74512 * 2.204089 ** 1.990542 * 1.452686 
+19 hours - - - 1.088616 1.255701 1.15375 1.359086 1.508832 1.943879 * 1.755615 * 1.223699 
+20 hours - - - - -0.015155 -0.036575 0.023245 0.087311 0.253271 0.262426 -0.077501 
+21 hours - - - - - -0.024505 0.043927 0.117833 0.31485 0.318019 -0.070305 
+22 hours - - - - - - - 0.137994 0.324942 0.328461 -0.041929 
+23 hours - - - - - - - 0.074888 0.276002 0.281564 -0.117753 
+24 hours - - - - - - - - 0.202707 0.214004 -0.196649 
+25 hours - - - - - - - - - 0.032115 -0.409059 
+26 hours - - - - - - - - - - -0.403714 
 
Note: Results highlighted in grey indicate statistically significant test results, where: ** – denotes statistical significance at 5% level and * – denotes statistical significance at 10% level.  
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 Finally, we also take into account the cost of trading in the execution of such an 
investment strategy.  
Figure 3 illustrates the performance of the combined strategy with different 
levels of transaction costs. It shows the same pattern of profitability on day t+1 with the 
jump between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. and the peak at 4:00 p.m. Between 10:00 a.m. 
and 5:00 p.m. this strategy is robust to trading costs adjustments and it always delivers 
positive results even after inclusion of relatively high levels of transaction costs.[15] 
 
Figure 3. Performance of combined strategy in the out–of–sample period 




In summary, we analysed a variety of different investment horizons, and we 
detected a clear and consistent pattern of possible profit opportunities for the investors 
who responded to the NBP announcements, for which there were statistically 
significant estimates of the NBP announcements dummy variables. This is an 







Results presented in this study clearly highlight the dominance of two types of 
announcements published by the NBP central bank in Poland, i.e. interest rates and 
money supply, which consistently exerted the strongest influence on assets’ prices in 
the broader financial market. 
The analysis based on models using the data from all 3 market segments also 
reveals that the bonds market and the foreign exchange market had the highest 
sensitivity.  
Tables 12 and 13 present a further breakdown of the statistically significant 
estimation results for the dummy variables from all models reported in Tables 4 – 8. 
Table 12 shows that the interest rate changes were the most dominant type of 
news (35 cases). They were followed by the money supply announcements (14 cases). 
The other two announcements, i.e. official reserves and current account, were less 
important (with only 9 and 7 cases reported in Table 12, respectively). 
As Table 12 further illustrates, the bonds market and the foreign exchange 
market were the most responsive market segments. The 5 year bond was the most 
sensitive instrument. Among the foreign exchange rates, the GBP/PLN was the most 
responsive currency pair. In case of the stock market, only the sWIG80 and the blue–
chip index WIG20, which includes the largest and most liquid companies, reacted to 
the NBP communication.  
Table 13 indicates that the changes of the revealed new macroeconomic figures 
of the NBP central bank influenced the financial market more than the deviations from 
the expectations (22 and 13 cases versus 18 and 12 cases, respectively). Once again, 





Table 12. Number of statistically significant (at p–value: 0.01, 0.05 or 0.10) coefficients’ estimates  




10 years  
bond  
yield 
1 year  
bond 
 yield 




































Interest rate 3 6 6 7 2 2 4 4 1 0 0 0 35 
Money supply (M3) 3 0 1 1 2 0 3 1 1 0 0 2 14 
Current account 1 0 0 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Official reserves 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 9 
SUM: 8 7 7 11 7 5 8 6 2 2 0 2 65 
 
Note: Every column presents the numbers of statistically significant estimates for each of 12 equations given by equation (1). Table 12 contains a summary of results for the variants of models with 




Table 13. Number of statistically significant (at p–value: 0.01, 0.05 or 0.10) coefficients’ estimates 







1 year  
bond 
 yield 
2 years  
bond  
yield 

































Increase 3 2 0 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 13 
Decrease 2 2 2 4 2 1 2 3 1 2 0 1 22 
Above expectations 0 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 1 12 
Below expectations 3 2 3 3 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 18 
SUM: 8 7 7 11 7 5 8 6 2 2 0 2 65 
 
Note: Every column presents the numbers of statistically significant estimates for each of 12 equations given by equation (1). Table 13 contains a summary of results for the variants of models with 





The overall finding from this study indicating clearly that bonds market and the 
foreign exchange market had the highest sensitivity is not surprising, because interest 
rate movements are, in fact, directly related to the bonds’ prices through the bond’s 
pricing model relationships, which link the bonds’ future cash flows with the interest 
rate that is used for discounting them. In the foreign exchange market, in turn, the 
transmission channel relies on the capital flows, which are triggered by changes in 
interest rates and money supply. In case of currencies, they manifest themselves, 
therefore, through the covered or uncovered interest rate parity relations. The 
responsiveness of the stock market is weaker, and the transmission channels there 
also depend on the capital flows, which in this instance cause shifts in demand and 
supply for/of stocks leading to the corresponding reactions of stock prices.  
More specifically, our results can be further explained as follows. First, in a small 
open economy, interest rate parity depends on the liquidity premium determined by 
differences in liquidity in the financial markets between home and foreign country as 
well as the expected change in the exchange rate. Therefore, our results showing that 
bonds market reacts with more sensitivity than stock market to central bank’s 
announcements may be explained by different liquidity premia components in the 
bonds and stock markets. Second, asset prices react to central bank communication if 
it is relevant to market participants in terms of the policy inclination or economic outlook 
and risks. As long as stock market investors tend to be relatively more long-term 
investors than bonds market investors, they may react to communication signalling 
because of more permanent (long-term) changes in economic outlook or policy. If 
central bank communication is more short-term oriented, then stock market 
participants may see it as less relevant and, hence, react with less sensitivity to it.  
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As further robustness check of our findings, we also estimated variants of 
models with alternative definitions of control variables in form of residuals obtained 
from regressing the global control variables (capturing global effects of monetary policy 
announcements) against the respective local instrument as dependent variable in our 
models (capturing relevant local effects). Summary of these results is presented in the 
Appendix in Tables A1 and A2, which show that there is exactly the same number of 
statistically significant cases (i.e 65 instances across all 3 markets) as in the models 
with the control variables without the adjustment. The pattern of results is also very 
similar: in terms of the degree of responsiveness, the most sensitive instruments are 
bonds followed by currencies and then the stock market (as it is evidenced by Table 
A1, which reports 36, 22 and 7 cases, respectively, with 33, 28 and 4 cases, 
respectively, in Table11). With regard to the type of announcements, once again the 
most important ones by far prove to be interest rates and then money supply, official 
reserves and current account data (32, 17, 10 and 6 versus 35, 14, 9 and 7 instances, 
respectively, in Table 12 and Table A1 in the Appendix). Moreover, the structure of the 
statistically significant estimates for the types of changes is very similar too, which is 
illustrated through a direct comparison of Table 13 and Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Therefore, the inclusion of alternative control variables did not alter the key findings, 
which consistently show that bonds market is the most sensitive one, while the stock 
market is the least responsive segment, whereas interest rates are the most influential 
types of monetary policy decisions news. 
Summarising, we can conclude that the results presented in our study provide 
robust evidence that the NBP central bank monetary policy news communication with 
financial market in Poland significantly affected assets’ prices during our sample period 
in years 2009 – 2019. 
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Our findings are generally consistent with the results from developed markets 
(such as Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013), Lucca 
and Moench (2015) and Cieślak, Morse and Vissing-Jorgensen (2019)) and with 
previous studies using emerging market data from Poland. In particular, our paper 
reports similar effects of the central banks’ communications as the earlier studies by 
Brzeszczyński and Kutan (2015) and Brzeszczyński, Gajdka and Kutan (2017), which 
also detected statistically significant reactions of different financial instruments to the 
NBP announcements with interest rates and money supply as the most influential type 
of news. Our work, however, is much more comprehensive, because it relies on the 
larger number of market segments and instruments analysed in one study as well as 
on longer and more recent data sample. Therefore, our results may be generalized 
under different time periods, i.e. early transition periods versus periods of a more 
matured emerging market economy, and may have relevance for analyses of other 
emerging markets, which have been implementing similar economic reforms, including 
the establishment of an independent central bank, as it was the case in Poland. 
Finally, we explored the profit opportunities based on the statistically significant 
estimates of the NBP announcements dummy variables in the in–sample period, which 
can be used as predictors for trades out–of–sample. We found that for a number of 
different investment horizons and different levels of transaction costs such profit 
opportunities did, in fact, exist. The patterns of results from the trading strategy 
reported in this study broadly confirm also the findings presented earlier by 
Brzeszczyński and Kutan (2015), who concluded too that the NBP communication with 
financial markets affected investors’ reactions on the emerging market in Poland during 
the early years of their sample period from 2000 to 2003 and indicated the existence 
of some profit opportunities. Again, our evidence relies, however, on an extended data 
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sample until the year 2020 and on a much larger number of market segments and 
instruments. 
The finding about the existence of profit opportunities relying on trades based 
on the NBP announcements is related to a very relevant practical matter that, at the 
same time, concerns also a very important theoretical issue regarding market 
efficiency. 
In Poland this issue is directly linked to liquidity. Based on the value and 
frequency of transactions, the bonds market is the least liquid one and the stock market 
is the most liquid segment, while the foreign exchange market in the Polish currency 
(PLN) is positioned between them as moderately liquid (which additionally depends 
also on the particular currency pair against the PLN with EUR/PLN or USD/PLN more 
liquid than e.g. CHF/PLN or JPY/PLN etc.). It needs to be emphasized too that 
although liquidity can be measured in many different ways, and there exist many 
measures to capture this phenomenon, liquidity in Poland is highly dependent on the 
frequency of trading, which is very low in the bonds market and also in the foreign 
exchange market it is lower than on the stock market. 
This pattern of liquidity across all 3 market segments in Poland is highly 
consistent with the pattern of the estimation results from our models reported in Tables 
4 – 8 (and also in the Appendix in Tables A1 and A2), where the biggest number of 
statistically significant estimates of dummy variables parameters was found in the 
bonds models, followed by foreign exchange rates models and then stock market 
models.  
In addition, it is worthwhile to note that these relations are also visible within 
certain sectors, which additionally supports the existence of a link with liquidity. For 
example, in the bonds models there are more cases of the statistically significant 
estimates of the dummy variables parameters for the least liquid bonds (with longer 
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maturities) than in case of more liquid bonds (with shorter maturities), i.e. 19 cases for 
10 years and 5 years bonds and 14 cases for 2 years and 1 year bond (with 22 and 14 
cases, respectively, in the versions of models with alternative control variables). 
Therefore, we interpret our findings in light of different levels of liquidity across 
all 3 market sectors, which suggests also different levels of market efficiency, leading 
to a conclusion about the unexploited investment opportunities that do not disappear 
immediately after the release of the NBP announcements (however with different 
degrees of market (in)efficiency across these 3 segments in line with their varying 





The results of our analysis suggest that the National Bank of Poland has been 
affecting the domestic financial market and that the investors react to its monetary 
policy news. Moreover, the effectiveness of the Polish central bank’s communication 
seems to have been enhanced in the most recent period during the last term of the 
Monetary Policy Council in office, which has been characterised by higher degree of 
collegiality of its members’ views. Such behavior of the broader financial market has 
obvious implications for, for example, fund managers etc. 
There also exist broader policy implications of our findings for other emerging 
markets.  
First, the results reported in this paper suggest that central bank communication 
in the emerging economies can trigger assets’ prices movements as a response to 
important announcements that these institutions regularly make. Second, this kind of 
an impact on prices can, on one hand, generate wealth effects but, on the other hand, 
can also create volatility (or: risk) effects. In consequence, the investors in emerging 
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markets, as our study using the Polish data demonstrates, need to be aware of the 
influence that the central banks may have on financial assets and should incorporate 
in the respective decision–making processes (or at least: anticipate) their actions. 
Third, both individual and institutional investors can create profitable trading strategies 
based on the central banks announcements, in particular over ultra-short intra-daily 
time horizons (as we show in this study), and they can also adjust their portfolios of 
financial assets in order to increase or decrease exposure to certain risks. Fourth, our 
results, showing that central bank communication affects asset prices in bonds market 
more than in stock market, have important social welfare and economic implications. 
The retired community and some public relying on investment profits in financial 
markets to smooth out their consumption behaviour need to be cautious in investing in 
bonds market from a short-run perspective as central bank communication may 
generate more volatility (risk) in this market in the short run. These investors are better 
off investing in stock market with a long-term focus. Fifth, results presented in this study 
indicate also the importance of conducting a transparent and effective central bank 
communication for financial stability. Such communication enhances the credibility of 
a central bank's actions and thus helps to maintain low inflation and a stable 
macroeconomic and financial environment with less frequent business cycles providing 
more stable cost of living and employment rates. This also raises social and economic 
welfare. Sixth, similarly to developed markets, the communication of central banks can 
be an important and effective monetary policy transmission mechanism in emerging 
market economies. Seventh, our results also have very direct implications for the 
assessment of market efficiency of different segments of the broader financial market, 
because the differences in reactions to the central bank’s news, in conjunction with the 
analysis of their liquidity, may further provide important knowledge in that regard as 
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well as may contribute to a better understanding of market efficiency as a financial 
concept. 
Regarding future research, our evidence from Poland, as the largest Central 
and Eastern European economy, may provide a yardstick for other emerging markets 
in the region, that also went through significant economic re-structuring and policy 
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[1] Policymakers also have been undertaking recently various actions, which aim at increasing central 
banks transparency and co-ordinating the existing codes of practice in this area. For example, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2020 published a document, called “The Central Bank 
Transparency Code – Staff Proposal”, which is a voluntary code proposal, composed of a 
comprehensive, central bank-focused set of principles and practices. The Central Bank 
Transparency (CBT) code is solely focused on central banks and it aims to encompass their broad 
range of mandates, governance frameworks and institutional arrangements. It is intended to allow 
central banks to map their transparency frameworks, improve the dialogue with their stakeholders 
and contribute to policy effectiveness. Central banks are encouraged in the CBT code to assess 
their existing transparency frameworks using the CBT as a guide and allow for more informed 
central bank choices on transparency and more effective communication between the central 
bank and its various stakeholders. IMF expects that a better understanding of the rationale for 
central bank mandate, governance, policies, operations, outcomes and official relations will 
reduce uncertainty and facilitate a public dialogue that can anchor public expectations and foster 
better policies. CBT code also recommends that central banks should actively engage with the 
public and stakeholders on its communication policy and actively evaluates their communication 
policy through, for example, surveys. These activities should be further described in the central 
banks’ annual reports (see: International Monetary Fund (2020)). 
[2] For example, in the year 2012 the WSE was the most active market not only in the CEE region but 
also in the whole Europe. The issuers listed on the WSE represented about 51% companies from 
the region’s exchanges and their share in equities trading in Central and Eastern Europe went up 
to 54.2% in 2012 (see: Fact Book 2013. Warsaw Stock Exchange (2013)). 
[3] See: Catalyst Report – Development Brief (2012). 
[4] For a broader review of the literature on the link between public announcements and financial markets’ 
reactions in emerging market countries see: Brzeszczyński, Gajdka and Kutan (2015). 
[5] Related recent literature has been dealing also with the issue of the investors’ demand for information 
ahead of the economic announcements and, in particular, about macroeconomic factors affecting 
the path of future interest rates as a measure of their uncertainty. In a recent study regarding this 
matter, Benamar, Foucault and Vega (2021) found that an increase in information demand before 
the influential economic announcements affecting investors’ beliefs about future interest rates 
predicts a stronger reaction of the U.S. Treasury note yields to these news.  
[6] Due to space limitations and the focus of our study, we review in this section mainly the papers, which 
investigate impact on assets’ prices or their returns. However, it needs to be mentioned that there 
exists also a related literature, which analyses the effects of central banks’ communication, their 
specific actons and the level of their transparency on the volatility of assets’ prices and on the 
resolution of uncertainty among the investors (see e.g. the publications by Nikkinen, Omran, 
Sahlström and Äijö (2006), Loiseau–Aslanidi (2011), Lyócsa, Molnár, Plihal (2019), Weber (2019) 
and Ehrmann and Talmi (2020), among others, and specifically for the results for Poland see the 
study by Brzeszczyński and Kutan (2015)). 
[7] An interesting paper on the emerging markets, but analysing different types of announcements than 
the release of monetary policy data, is the work by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002). They 
investigated what types of local and neighboring–country news (such as agreements with 
international organizations and credit rating changes) caused stock market movements during 
the Asian crisis. 
 [8] The literature on the importance of central banks’ communication has recently expanded also in new 
directions beyond the traditional investigations of financial markets’ reactions, which includes now 
the analyses of consumers’ expectations and their perceptions. For example, Lamla and 
Vinogradov (2019) investigated the effects of the FED announcement events on perceptions and 
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expectations of inflation and interest rates in the US. They found that informed consumers tend 
to have lower perceptions and expectations, higher confidence and also smaller errors in case of 
perceived inflation. The importance of central banks’ monetary policy has also been investigated 
from the perspective of the risk-taking inclinations. For example, Hussain, Bashir and Bilal (2021) 
reported, based on their study using the data from China, that loose monetary policy increases 
bank risk-taking behaviour. Their findings evidence that the bank-specific factors (such as size, 
liquidity and capitalization) do not significantly affect the risk-taking channel, however the market 
structure does have a stabilizing effect on the monetary policy transmission and on the level of 
risk-taking effects. 
[9] Another interesting area in this stream of literature, although quite often overlooked in case of 
emerging markets research, is the analysis of investors’ reactions to public announcements in 
terms of the changes in their activity (see e.g. the study by Brzeszczyński and Kutan (2015), 
which investigated this issue by using the volume of trade data from the foreign exchange market 
in Poland derived from the Reuters dealing system for currency trading). 
[10] Indices WIG, WIG20 and sWIG80 are listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) and they are 
most important reference benchmarks for the WSE investors. WIG is a broad market index, 
WIG20 is a ‘blue chip stocks’ index of the 20 largest and most liquid companies and sWIG80 is 
an index of small stocks. By selecting these 3 indices, we are able to measure and compare the 
market reactions in case of different stock sizes. 
[11] The foreign exchange rates are defined as the number of units of the Polish zloty (PLN) per one unit 
of the foreign currency (USD, EUR, GBP, CHF or JPY). 
[12] Given that monetary policy shocks in the global markets may be interlinked with monetary policy 
decisions in other local markets (see e.g. evidence presented by Igan et al. (2011) relying on the 
data from the US market and markets in 17 other countries), as a matter of additional robustness 
check we also estimated versions of all models with alternative control variables that are capable 
of isolating any possible effects of domestic- from foreign driven monetary policy announcements. 
We captured the effect of foreign versus domestic influences by regressing the global control 
variables against the respective instrument from our models and by extracting the residuals. In 
the next step, these residuals were used as an alternative control variable and all models were 
re-estimated accordingly with it in their new specifications in order to perform further robustness 
checks. The results are summarised in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix. 
[13]  We estimated also alternative specifications of models under other distributional assumptions than 
the normal distribution, such as: Student’s t-distribution, Student’s t-distribution with fixed degrees 
of freedom, Generalized Error (GED) distribution and also Generalized Error (GED) distribution 
with fixed parameters. The results were found to be very similar in terms of the value of the 
estimated parameters and their significance etc. For example, in the first model for 10 years bonds 
reported in Table 4 the original estimate of the first statistically significant dummy for the 
RATE_DOWN variable under the normal distribution assumption was: -0.0157 (significant at 5% 
level), while the estimates under those four alternative distributional assumptions were: -0.0189 
(significant at 1% level), -0.0172 (significant at 1% level), -0.0151 (significant at 5% level) and       
-0.0144 (significant at 5% level), respectively. We can conclude, hence, that these results are 
qualitatively the same and the change of the distributional assumptions did not have any material 
effect on them. 
[14] The voting reports, which present the Monetary Policy Council members’ voting results, were 
obtained directly from the National Bank of Poland (NBP) and they are available at: 
https://www.nbp.pl/homen.aspx?f=/en/publikacje/o_polityce_pienieznej/voting.html 
[15] Trading costs always differ depending on such factors as size of transactions, trading platforms used 
by investors or even individual arrangements between the investors as customers and the 
companies owning / managing the trading platforms, so in reality there is no single trading costs 
level that can be uniformly adopted for any particular instrument. Therefore, we used in our study 
a spectrum of different trading costs to illustrate how the presented strategies perform depending 
on what trading costs are applied. However, we also indicate here what are the ‘typical’ trading 
costs in the 3 markets analysed in our paper for round-trip transactions (i.e. buying and selling), 
which are about 0.4% - 0.6% in the bonds market and about 0.8% - 0.9% in the stock market. In 
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the foreign exchange market, the trading cost is substantially smaller and it depends mainly on 
the bid-ask spread, which can widely vary even during one day, but it should be assumed to be 
on average around 0.02% - 0.05% (also for round-trip transactions). Therefore, for the strategy 
presented in this paper, which is heavily dominated by bonds, the most typical trading cost to 
execute it can be assumed to be around 0.5% level. In Figure 3 we further illustrate a variety of 
results using a broader interval (where 0.5% is positioned in the middle of it) to reflect the 
situations that some (usually larger) investors can achieve lower trading cost, while for some other 
(usually smaller) investors the trading cost can be substantially higher. In summary, the graph in 
Figure 3 depicts the results of the strategy with inclusion of a typical trading cost around the middle 
of the assumed costs spectrum (i.e. the middle of the horizontal axis titled: ‘Transaction costs’) 
and demonstrates how this strategy performs when such typical cost deviates upwards or 
downwards depending on the value of executed transactions, size of the investors (and their 
overall volume of trade), method of trading etc. 
[16] As additional robustness check, we also tested the models with longer leads and lags, but the 
statistical significance in these cases was, naturally, diminishing or even completely disappearing. 
For example, the results for all 3 market segments covering all 12 instruments in models with 
additional lag k = -3 and lead k = +3 show that there was an increasingly smaller number of 
additional instances of statistical significance across all instruments from all market segments. 
Consistently with all other findings, they were detected more often for the lag (k = -3) rather than 
the lead (k = +3) and they were the case most often in bonds market models, while the most 









Table A1. Number of statistically significant (at p–value: 0.01, 0.05 or 0.10) coefficients’ estimates  




10 years  
bond  
yield 
1 year  
bond 
 yield 




































Interest rate 4 3 7 6 2 2 4 0 2 1 0 1 32 
Money supply (M3) 5 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 4 0 0 3 17 
Current account 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 
Official reserves 1 0 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 10 
SUM: 13 3 11 9 4 4 6 2 6 3 0 4 65 
 
Note: Every column presents the numbers of statistically significant estimates for each of 12 equations given by equation (1). Table A1 contains a summary of results for the variants of models with 
dummy variables with lags and leads spanning from lag -2 to lead +2 with alternative control variables. 
 
 
Table A2. Number of statistically significant (at p–value: 0.01, 0.05 or 0.10) coefficients’ estimates 














































Increase 3 0 2 2 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 14 
Decrease 3 1 3 3 1 1 4 0 2 2 0 1 21 
Above expectations 2 1 3 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 11 
Below expectations 5 1 3 3 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 1 19 
SUM: 13 3 11 9 4 4 6 2 6 3 0 4 65 
 
Note: Every column presents the numbers of statistically significant estimates for each of 12 equations given by equation (1). Table A2 contains a summary of results for the variants of models with 
dummy variables with lags and leads spanning from lag -2 to lead +2 with alternative control variables. 
 
